For most historians, I gather, phenomenology lies somewhat outside the bounds of the discipline. It is, in the tradition of English and American historiography, neither a ’speculative’ philosophy of history (usually exemplified by Hegel and deemed somewhat disreputable), nor an analytic one. Nor does it fall within the accepted practice of historians, for the moment. This may change – I’ve noticed quite a few new books on phenomenology available, usually aimed at introducing the reader to Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc, assuming that they are coming to these authors from a different tradition.
From time to time articles appear on a phenomenological approach to history – indicating that some anglophone historians are working within this tradition. But these have been appearing since not long after Husserl published his Crisis, with little broad take up by historians. The result is, such as in a review of a book by David Carr (the English translator of the Crisis) on time consciousness, narrative and history, a somewhat baffled one. They find it difficult to place – it does not fit into their categories.
However, I can’t help thinking that there would be much benefit for english-world historians to adapt their tradition to allow some take up of phenomenological themes. If you are to speak about the political affect of histories, of their connection with our social identity, our consciousness of people as members of particular communities, traditions, nations, each with their own histories, then a phenomenological approach has much to contribute. In particular, it reconnects historical inquiry with experiences of history, without reducing history to only the present-day creation of a narrative structure pasted over the top of a now irretrievable random structure of events . It is no longer simply a group of professionals speaking to themselves about obscure debates and the obscure past, but is connected with questions about what it might mean to remember, what it might mean to experience the past in a particular way. These questions are already asked – I’m not saying phenomenology has the only access pass to these thoughts, but it does possess a methodological rigour that is of value. Perhaps I am strawman-ing here, (in fact I’m almost certain of it), but sometimes the straw man is real.
For some thoughts about what it might mean to experience the past, have a look at Meredith’s posts on memory in Berlin – on the way that memory in Berlin is a public act, that you are invited to take a part in, to participate in. There are three posts, here, here and here.
Filed under: Hegel, Historiography, Husserl, history, phenomenology, random thoughts , experiences of history, foundations of history, phenomenology of history, writing history
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